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54TH CONGRESS, }

HOUSE OP REPRESENTA'lTVES.

2d Session.

REPORT
{

No. 2548.

REORGANIZATION OF THE LINE OF THE ARMY.

JANUARY

Mr.

19, 1897.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state
of the Union and ordered to be printed. ·

HULL,

from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the
following

REPORT.
[To accompany H. R. 5835.]

The Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the bill
(H. R. 5835) to reorganize the line of the Army, etc., having consid-

ered the same, recommend that the bill do pass with the following
amendments:
On page 2, section 6, line 3, strike out "six" and insert "seven,"
and on page 3, section 8, line 2, strike out "six" and insert "seven."
The .Report of the Secretary of War for 1883 calls the attention of
Congress to the needs of the Army in the following language:
The report of the General of the .AI-my bas a special interest in being the last
annual report that General Sherman will make. At his own request he has been
relieved from the command of the Army, preparatory to his retirement from active
service under the act of 1882. He has, therefore, thought it best to refrain from
making any new r ecommendations in his report, leaving that duty to his successor
in t he command of the Army, Lieutenant-General Sheridan. He, however, calls
attent ion to, and renews a for mer recommendation that a new organization be
adopt ed for the regiments of infantry so that each shall be composed of twelve companies, making three battalions of four companies each. And tha,'t the National
Guard and volunteers of the States would soon follow suit, and we should have
throughout t he country these small, handy battalions of four companies instead of
the large cumbersome regiments of ten companies, a bad tactical unit and in practice always scattered.

The Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the year 1884 says:
The Lieut enant-General renews the recommendation of General Sherman that there
should be m~de a._uniform organization of the three arms of the ser.vice by adding
two compames with th e corr esponding majors to each regiment of infantry and
concurs in the r ecommendation of the Lieutenant-General.
'

Report of Secretary of War for the year 1885 Rays:
~e Lieutenant -Gene~al commends_to ca~eful co_n~i~eration the policy of concentrating troops and putt m g large garri sons m the vicm1ty of large cities as a measure
of ec?nomy, ~he present r ailroad fac ilities. being ample to, transport them to the
fron_tier speedily wJien needed, an~ also a~am recommends the addition of two companies and _t wo ~a-Jors to each regiment of infantry, and thus making the three arms
of the service umform. In both t h ese recommendations I concur.

In the report of the Secretary of War for the year 1889 it is stated
thatTh;e Major-General Commanding recommends the reorganization of the artillery,
making seven regiments instead of :five and dropping the additional first lieutenants,

the extra subaltern officers being, in his judgment, no longer necessary.

2

REORGANIZATION OF THE LINE OF THE ARMY.

The Secretary, continuing, further states:
I fully concur in his recommendations, and deem it very important that authority
for these new regiments should be granted. In view of the diminished requirement
for the use of the Army against the Indians, it may seem at first as if no additional
force is required; but even in times of the most perfect apparent security the strength
of the Army should bear some proportion to the pop ulation of the country.
From our great increase of population the relative strength of the Army is rapidly
diminishing. In 1870, with an enlisted strength of not quite 10,000 larger than now,
the ratio of enlisted men to population was one-eleventh of 1 per cent, or 1 man out
of 1,105; in 1880, with the enlisted strength 1,000 less than it is now1 one-twenti th
of 1 per cent; at the present time, with a population of 65,000,000, 1t is thirty-nine
one thousandths, or less than one twenty-fifth of 1 per cent, being 1 man for every
2,569 of population. The authorized strength of the Army is now 30,000, but only
25,000 is appropriated for. On the full basis of 30,000 its relative strength to population would still be considerably less than in 1880, and one-half what it was in
1870. The organization of these two. regiments is required by the change in situation as a larger proportion of the force is needed for seacoast defense, and it should
be made, if in no other way, by the reorganization of two regiments from the other
arms of the service. But this is not called for, would not be the best policy, and I
trust will not be considered.
Nearly every warlike power has adopted the three-battalion formation for infantry.
Persia, China, and the United States are almost alone in adhering to the ingl battalion system. The requirements of our ser vice have been such as to give scant
opportunity for the study and trial of new ideas. During our civil war only th
present exigency could be considered ; at q_ther times our little Army has beens attered in small detachments over our vast domain. The conditions are now changed;
the larger part of the Army can soou be at regimental, or at least, battalion po ts.
The necessit,y for this formation in the infantry is even greater than in the cavalry
and artillery, where it has long been t he rule. The reason for the change, alway
~trong, has now, in view of the greater deployment necessary because of the
improvement iu small arms, become imperative.
Twelve years ago the report to Congress of officers sent to investi~ate the armi
of E urope and Asia and to suggest what changes should be made m onr .Army to
modernize and perfect it strongly urged the adoption of this system. General
rant, herman, and heridan have r ecommended it, and it is favored by the lea.ding
officers in our pr esent service. From a military standpoint the question doe not
seem to require evidonce or argument, but merely examination and action . With
~bis.change and the elimination of the extra first li eutenants of artillery, the organ1zat1on of the three arms of the service will be, as it should be, uniform and upon one
harmonious basis.

The Secretary's report for 1890 ays:
As a_military question there is no difference of opinion as to the advisability and
ne e 1ty_ of the three-battalion formation for infantry. Every European power h
adopted 1_t, a
he leading gen ral of our country-including Grant, herman,
and '
commended it.
ow that our small Army can be stationed in
1a1'
tions of s rvic ar fully suited to its use. It already prevail
~
be rvice, and there are even stronger reasons for it in th
1
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o
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ict the ationa.l Guard and college and
t
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w
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, on which to build in ca e of necessity, and a cornumb rs.
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The single-battalion organization of infantry ts radically defective and unfit for
actual service under present conditions. During the period since the civil war om.·
infantry organization has remained unchanged, and is now, in respect to the single-_
battalion feature, obsolete. It is so vicious that the first step, in case of war,
· must be to abolish it and to start anew. It can not be amended or modified; it is
unwieldy, incapable of subdivision to either make or meet attack under methods
now prevailing, and the situation grows worse with every improvement of arms.
'rhe development of range, rapidity, and accuracy of fire of modern arms bas been so
great that a smaller and more flexible battalion is essentia], for this development
makes celerity in handling troops on the field a prime necessity.
The adoption of the three-battalion, system has been repeatedly urged by all our
distinguished generals, and General Sherman considered it of such commanding
importance that he made it the only subject of recommendation in bis last report
as General of the Army.
.
But important as it was at that time, it is a necessity now, for under the new tactics reqnired by the increase in range and rapidity of fire a ten-company battalion
can not be maneuvered.

The Secretary of War's report for 1892 says:
Since the present organjzation of our infantry was adopted many changes have
taken place in the art of war, resulting, among other things, in a material modification of the form of infantry re~iments. Our stationary condition in this respect has
left us with an obsolete orgamzation, the defects of which, however, have been so
exhanstive]y discussed in former reports from this Department that they are only
referred to in the present instance as a means of urgently renewing the recommendations of nearly all my predecessors in behalf of three-battalion infantry regiments

The Secretary of War's report for 1894 says:
I earnestly 1·ecommend that Congress enact the legislation necessary to establish
in the Army the battalion formation, now adopted by the armies of every other civilized nation. As necessary to effect that change, I recommend the removal of the
limit of 25,000 men fixed by the act of June 18, 1874, and a return to the limit fixed
by the act of Jnly 15, 1870. Legislative approval of these two propositions will
restore to the effective force about 4,000 enlisted men, bringing the actual strength
of the Army up to the nominal strength now fixed by law.
The organization of the line of the Army has undergone no material change since
the close of the civil war. During this period of thirty years every large foreign
army has been completely reorganized. Changes an<l. improvements in arms, ammunition, and equipments have forced upon the leading strategists and tacticians of
the great armies of the world the necessity of a broad departure from the old
systems. All have adopted the battalion as the tactical unit for infantry and artillery serving as infantry, and nearly all the equivalent of the squadron as the cavalry
unit. The light-artillery battalion has a similar composition. Should our Army
ever be brought into collision with disciplined foreign troops our present formation
would prove so defective as to turn the scale against us in a conflict on terms otherwise equal.
I· or some years the Secretaries of War, the Generals Commanding the Armv, and
the most eminent authorities in military science in this country have urged the
adoption of the battalion formation, and our most progressive and best-informed
officers believe that the organization of our small Army should embody this u1:1iversally approved result of modern military thought.
Four companies are as large a body as is now possible for one officer to lead and
control in action. Formerly, and down to a recent date, the colonel could see and
dire t the mov.ements of all the men of bis regimen~ :who marched and fought in
double rank with touch of elbows. Under such cond1t10ns a reo·iment of 1 000 men
occupied a front on the battle line no greater than would now b; covered by a smail
battalfon of one-third that number. A few years ago small-arms fire was ineffective
at distances greater that 600 or 800 yards, while now it will be deadly at ranges of
2,000 yards, or at even greater distances.
·
~n modern '!arfare th~ me~ wil~ act in small groups or singly, and the advance
will be made m successive Imes m open order. Perfect organjzation and perfect
control by the commander of each unit will be absolutely essential to efficiency and
success in the field.
The National Guard of several of the States, more progressive than the General
Government, already has the three-battalion organization, and our own Army is
being instructed as tho~ough!y a~ our defec~ive system will permit, battalions of
from two to five companies bemg improvised m the differe1:t garrisons.
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The Secretary's report for 1895 practically repeats in the , ame language his recommendations in 1894.
In the Secretary's report for 1896 he again recommends action to
correct the defects of regimental organization that have been pointed
out in previous years, and further states that-The completion of several defensive works and installation of their modern armament at points where no troops are stationed, and the approaching completion of
other modern batteries, suggest the pressing n eed of a larger force of artilleri
than is now available. The present approved plans of sea-coast defen e involve the
establishment of upward of 100 distinct batteries, groupeu in twenty or more
harbors. In each must be a garrison of sufficient strength to take care of all the
guns and other public property in the harbor, and the maintenance of all iu a state
of efficient defense. Some addition to the present force of artillery will therefore
be indispensably necessary.

The following statement from the Senate report (No. 231) of t~
first session of the Fifty-second Congress so strongly present the w1
dom of this country adopting the three-battalion organization for the
infantry that it is here introduced:
Of the necessity, under modern conditions of arms, of the three-battalion rganization for infantry there can be no question. Every civili:;,;e<l nation bas ::ulop~ l
it, and every military authority insists upon it. \Var attempted to bo wao·pd with
the single-battalion formation would be national , uicicle.
.
The cavalry and artillery arms now have the formation. How mnch mor 1111portant it is that the infantry should be aided toward that condition whi ch alone an
insure success to our arms.
A. leading officer of the British Army says:
"In armies, infantry undoubtedly takes the lead, and to it!! action that of th
other arms must be subordinated. It is the mainstay and backbone of all, wh ther
it be reviewed in the light of numbers or its action upon the fiel<l of battle. I~ ~re
is more deadly than that of artillery · its action is snre, while that of cavalry 1 ht•
fol; upon it the brunt of the battle t'all ; it suffers more in action, ancl mo~·e on th
line of march, and on its tactics the whole superst,ructure of military operation mu t
be built."
And yet while the other arms of the service have been materially aided toward
P rfection. of organization during the last tw nty year , the infantry br_a n ~ b
been per~:m tt d to ta.nd still, and to-day is as far behind in ta tical orgamzat10n a
th?ugh _it was armed witl_t the flint-lock musket, canying the b_nc~-and-ball c~rtndge, m t ad of ~he prmgfield bree •bloader with its deadly mi sile. It r t 1?
th
n-c mp:l'ny mgl -ba~talion organization that eem. to have been_ ad pte~l in
1 21, an
h1ch would bnng death, def at and disast r to our arm m an. h ld
el? ~a m n up~m hicb we would enter, m ting, as we would, the chang d ondi 1 n of
t1
and armament of armie framed upon modern and a.pprov d
m th d.
In
oa
w have pr gr
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moothb r mu k
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'rank 600 yards. Every r egimental command~r of our late. war will app:r:eciate ~he
difficulty of commandin g even th is length of Jme. In ~he dm of battle ne~ther v:oJCe
nor bugle note can easily be heard. The noise of conflict has been greatly mtens1fi.ed
by the introduction of the breech-loading repeating :firearm.
I Von Scherff, the great German military writer, referri~g to the Franco-Prussian
war, says: "It was very difficult for officers to keep their men tog~fher, because of
the noise of a close conflict between breecbloader and breechloader.
Let the single line be leno-thened by intervals between the files, as it must now
be and how powerless would any colonel be to control and command his regiment.
H~ absolutely needs the three-battalion formation with a subordinate commander,
a major, for each battalion. He can not even personally comruaud one and ~upervise the action of the others, for with the battalions properly placed accordmg to
modern tactics, each in rear of the other, the first with its skirmish_ers and supportin o- lines and columns holding a front of 200 yards and a depth of 400, the second
and third battalions in column, with spaces of about 250 yards intervening; with a
total depth (owing to the far penetrating power of the modern arm) of about 1,000
yards, being about the depth of a division prepared for battle as it was ~ormed in
the three-line brigade organization during our war, the colonel commandmg could
not only not be heard, but in most cases he could not see his command. ~he
lieutenant-colonel, as the title implies, is needed as the lieutenant or general assistant of the colonel, a.nd the majors commanding battalions become an absolute necessity for successful warfa,r e.
To sum up the tactical matter, the old line-of-battle formation used during our
civil war "now belon<rs to the past as completely as the Macedonian phalanx, and
the general who would use it would simply invite the murder of his army and sacrifice the cau e of his country on the alte1· of imbeci1e conservatism." The present
organization is objectionable in that it has no expansive power and must be totally
changed in time of war, thus violating a familiar military maxim that "the plan of
an army should be the same in time of peace as in time of war."
This has caused the abandonm_en t by foreign powers of the "system" in vogue hefe
which it is the object of this bill to reorganize.
Among the first and most important recommendations in the report to Congress
made by the military commission sent abroad from this country, published in 1877,
is the chauge of system contemplated by this bill.
A. paragraph from that report (Upton's Armies of Asia and Europe) shows the
organization of the infantry branch of the service abroad:
"The infantry of the German Empire consists, in time of peace, of one hundred
and forty-eight regiments of three battalions each (p. 192).
"The influence of the Franco-Prussian war in producing modification in military
organization is nowhere more perceptible than in the French infantry. Four companies were substituted for six in the composition of a battalion, and a regiment
was ordered to be made of four battalions. Since that time the three-battalion
organization has been ~dopted by F rance (p. 226).
"In Russia tbe regiments of the three divisions of the guard and the six divisions
of the army of the< aucasus have four battalions of four companies each. All other
regiments have three battalions o_f :five companies each (p. 149).
"The A.ustriau infantry is organized into regiments composed of five field battalions of four companies each and one depot battalion of five companies. In case of
war the six battalions are organized into two regiments of three battalions each, the
fifth company of the depot battalion remaining as a common depot for both regiments (p. 162).
"In Italy a battal~on consists_ of four companies and a regiment of three battalions·
and a. depot. The nflemen regmients are composed of four battalions each (p.102).
"How c?m~let 1y_ the ~rmy of Japan bas been Europeanized may be inferred from
the orgamzat1on of the mfantry. .A. regiment consists of three battalions of four
companies each" (p. 9).
The _infantrr regiments. of England are composed of eight companies, forming two
~attahons of four compames each. Even this organization so much better than ours
1~ severely condemned by _he: own military cri~ics, notably' by the most eminent Gen:
Sir Lumley Gralrnm, who 111s1sts that the Prussian three-battalion formation is much
better. General p~on condemns it i1_1 ~he following_ terme:
The adherence of England to a military-system mherited from the last century
can only be explained by her insular position and the security from invasion afforded
by a powerful navy. * . *. * Should England _assail any of her formidable neighbors, w~ m~y safely anticipate that the war will be followed either by a speedy
reorgamzat1on of her army or by the total abandonment of the policy of armed
intervention in foreign affairsn (pp. 268,269).
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The infantry organization of but two nations conforms to ours. The e are China
and Persia, whose armies are laughed at by the world.
The ablest soldiers of the Republic have recommended this change in the strongest language, amounting at times to a supplication. General Grant desired it.
Generals Sherman, Sheridan, and Schofield have earnestly urged it.
As long ago as in .1869 General Sherman, then in command, suggested a change in
our "system," which received the approval of the Secretary of War.
In 1874-75 General Sherman said:
"Inasmuch as the Regular Army will naturally form the standard of organization
for any increase or for new r egiments of v olunteers, it becomes important to study
this subject in the light of past experience and to select that form which is he. t _for
peace as well as war. A cavalry r egiment is now composed of twel ve compani ,
usually divided into six squadrons of two companies eacb, or better, subdivided into
three battalions of four companies each. This is an excellent form, easily admitting
of subdivision as wen as union into larger masses.

*
"The ten-company organization is awkward in practice, and I am satisfiecl that
the infantry regiment should have the same identical organization as exists for the
?avalry and artil~ery, namely, twelve companies, so as to be S?sceptible of d~vision
rnto three battalions of four companies each. These compames sh ould habitually
b e about 100 men strong, giving 1,200 to a regiment, which in practice would ettle
down to about 1,000 men. 'l'hree such regiments would compo~e a briga~e, three
brigades a division, and three divisions a corps. Then by allowmg to an rnfantry
corps a brigade of cava1ry and six batteries of field artillery, we would have an efficient corps <l'armee of 30,000 men whose organization would be simple and mo t
efficieut, and whose strength should never be allowed to fall below 25,000 meu."

The following extract from a memorandum prepare~ ~t the _ar
Department and placed before the House Committee on Military Affair
further sustains the proposition that a reorganization of troop. in to
small battalions for tactical purposes is indispensable to the Affic1 ncy
of the Army, and explains generally the provisions of the accompanying bill:
The a~gu~ent from a military standpoint in favor of a subdivision of t~e regimental hue mto ma.lier tactical units under the command of field officer 1s very
briefly stated as follows :
All who h_ave participated in a. modern battle, and all students of military science
agr e,. that m order to push home an attack against an enemy who use a weapou t~at
can kill at 2,500 yards, successive lines or waves to fill the losses of the leadrn '
troops are.nee_ sa.ry, a well as the distribution of the attacking front into group
de}_)l yed m line , so that advantage can be taken of every foot of the ground that
off r cover and protection.
eces arily this greatly increases the difficulty of the
co_utrol of a_b
en and their proper leading into hot fight, when all are arm~d
1
w th r P at1
h-loaders, this owing to the. distribution and great increa m
e covered by the enemie ' fire which bas to be pa d over.
·
e m v ment of hi whole regiment of 1,000 men
t all times.
ow a small battalion mu t
by a whole regiment formed a ordin
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h, ndle in the tres of the modem
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Memo1'a1tdum to accompany a draft of a bill for the 1·eo1·ganization of the line of the .Arm!J.

There has never been a time in the history of our country when any considerable
portion of the population desired or necessities demanded a large standing army~ an
institution obnoxious to the spirit of our people; neither has there ever been a time
when the need of a small regularly organized force bas not been found esslmtial to
the public welfare and its numbers have varied from a minimum of a few hundred
men at the close of the last century, to an authorized maximum of about 75,000 men
in 1866. From 1870 to 1874 its legal strength was 30,000; in 187?\ it was reduced to
25 000 and it has remained at this strength to the present time. This force is organiz~d ·i~to 40 regiments, 1 separate battalion, and various detachments required for
staff duties. 'l'he numbers of the Hospital Corps is variable, depending upon the
needs of the service. It is now 711.
The organization and the distributi<Jn of the troops to the several arms on January 1 last, was :
Total

enlisted.
Cavalry •.•••••.•••••••••.••••... - - - - . - • -... - .... --....... - -... - - - - •. • - - - - • 6, 252

Artillery .....••••....•••..•.•................ -. - - -- --.. -- . - - - - - '- - - - - - . - - - - • 4-, 025

13
1nft~~i
r
r~
~"i :i~gi~~~~;: :::: :::: :::::::::::::::::::::: :::: :::::::::::::::::: ' ~~g
Ordnance detachments ............. -..... -- ... - -- - . --- - .. -- - -- - ..... - -- - - - .
485

West Point detachments ....................... - -- - -- - - - . -- -- . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indian scouts .............•.................. - - -. - . -- - - -- -- - - -... - - -.. - - . - •
Signal corps ..........••..•............................... -............ - - . .
Ordnance sergeants........................................................
Commissary sergeants ..•.•............................. -.. - - . - ....... . - - . . .
Post quartermaster sergeants ......... .... ............................... -.. -.
Hospital Corps............. . • • • • . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

220
62
50

110
90
80

711

Total ....•••••••••••.•....•..•..•....................•••.. : • • • . . • • • • . 25, 710
The cavalry force-is 10 regiments of 12 troops each, only 10 of which are manne!1,
giving an aggregate of about 625 men per regiw ent, or about 60 men per troop rn
service. Twenty troops exist only on a skeleton basis.
The artillery is 5 regiments of 12 batteries each~ 2 of which are equipped and serve
as fielcl artillery. The remaining 10 batteries per regiment, or 50 in a.11, are in charge
of the seacoast defenses. Each artillery regiment numbers about 800 men. The
light batteries have 75 and the foot 65 men each.
The infantry is 25 regiments of 10 companies each. The regiment numbers 525
men and the company 65, but 50 of these companies exist only on a skeleton basis.
Were all the companies and troops manned that are now authorized by law the
numerical strength of each would of necessity be much less than now. The mean
for all organizations now in service is 65 men each, but to man the skeleton companies on same basis would require quite 4,000 additional soldiers.
A.s respects distribution of this force, the equivalent of 1 regiment of ca,valry, 4
of artillery, and 8 of infantry are stationed east of the Mississippi. The remainderthat is to say, 9 regiments of cavalry, 1 of artillery, and 17 of infantry-are w,est of
the Mississippi, including 6 of the 10 light batteries.
The cavalry.-The plan of reorganization herewith submitted contemplates no
~hange in the cavalry ar~ b~yond t~e manning of the skeleton troops and completrng the squadron orgamzat10n, while the total number of troopers would remain
unchanged.
·
The infantry.-This_arm must fu_rnish the mass of any army. The other arms are
accessory and subordmate to the mfantry. Upon its tactics the whole superstructu_r~ _of military <;>perations must be built . . Nearly all of the National Guard and
m.1ht1a are of this arm, and they have a right to expect to see in each regular
infantry regiment a model for their guidance.
By the reorganization 3:ct of 1866 the infantry force was fixed at 45 regiments, the
cavalry at 10, and the artillery at 5. In 1869 the number of infantry reo-iments officers a~d ~ en, was reduced nearly one-half, and in 1874 and subsequently a fufther
reduction m men brought_ the total down from over 28,000 in 1868 to less than 13,000.
There ~a.a than an~ has smce been no reduction in t4e cavalry or artillery.
1:}ie rnfantry regime~t as at pre~ent constituted, 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1
maJor, and 10 compames, .dates from the army-reorganization act of 1821. Since
then the armament, formation, and system of evolntion of all modern armies has been
changed-some of them many times. Our arms, equipments and systems of drill have
kept pace with the world's progress in these regards, and we have done what was
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possible to adapt the incongruous 10-company regiment to the modern requirement
of smal1, compact battalions of 4 companies, but this result has been only partially
attainable.
The only change necessary to secure the regimental formation desired is the addition of 2 companies and remanning of the 2 that have been skeletonized, making
12 per egiment in all, divided into 3 battalions, each with its own major to
command.
Should the infantry organization be completed as propo!!ed, the number of companies equipped would be increased by 100, making the total infantry force 75 b~ttalions of 4 companies, or about 240 men each. In time of emergency deman1hng a
speedy increase of the number of men, the battalion could be increased to 400 me~.
The next expansion would involve the addition of a fourth battalion to each regtmen t. Through these steps the number of infant r ymen could be doubled without
changing the organization at all.
•
The artillery.-The reorganization of the present artillery force into7 regime~ts of
12 batteries each will provide 84 batteries of artillery, an increase of 24-, of which 14
may be :field batteries and 70 for coast defense:
.
In emergency the regular troops, with their organizations filled to the maximum,
might have to form the first line of defense while the further resources of the country were being made available. In that case the infantry and cavalry regiments
would form an army corps of about 40,000 men. Fourteen 6-gun batteries wou_ld
provide 84 guns for this corps, or a proportion of about 2 guns per 1,000 men. While
this proportion might be sufficient on certain theaters of war, it is the smallest that
should be contemplated.
The value of preparation in this respect will be evident to any student of the
early operations of the civfl war. The lack of a navy on the part of the Confederate States made serious attack upon the Federal seaports a thing not to be ~pprehendec\, A large proportion of the artillery on seacoast service could therefore be
mounted as field batteries, for which service both officers and men had been prepared by training in time of peace. But it is a foregone conclusion that in anr war
such as is now at all possible, our heavy batteries will be urgently needed m the
seacoast fortifications. The above minimum proportion of field ~uns should therefore be provided as the nucleus for the volunteer batteries which must form the
~reater portion of this arm in fane of war. A reasonable preparation in this ~esp~ct
1s all the more neces ary in view of the greater time needed for the orgamzat1on
and training of volunteer field artillery as compared with other arms.
.
. The proposed organization of the artillery will provide 70 foot batteries for service
m ea oa t fortifications. The necessity for such a provi ion becomes more apparent with eYery addition to the number of emplacements, guns, and carriages in the
modern defenses.
The problem is, on the one hand, to determine the minimum number of tra.i?e~
men nece sar
kers" of costly mu,t rial in time of peace! a.nd the mm1~nm numb r
war garrison ; on th other hand, to reconcil th e
· · n of cost.
\ '
ill require a total of 29,314 enli ted
ortar . On th , peace footing the
m n, every one of w horn would be
now cont mplated by the R vi ed
n; by a. further po sihle incr a
·
ween 17,000 and
th ld or a.nirovicl the war
re would bea.
o be
tions
nomy

·ent\
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12 and 15. Not all of these will require permanent garrisons in time of peace. The
w~rk of instruction will be carried on in the larger fortifications, ~hile detach1!1en.ts
ent out from time to time will suffice for the care and preservation of material m
the others. It is believed that 70 companies of seacoast artillery will enable this
work to be properly done, but that it is the minimum number that should be
expected to do so .
.Redistribution, 30,000 men.-This improvement could be accomplished through an
addition to the present enlisted force of about 4,300 men, and will leava the total
strength the same as that fixed by section 1115 of the Revised Statutes. The distribution would then stand about as follows:
Men.

Cavalry, 30 squadrons ..........•............... ··.···· .... ···-·· ........•... 6,170
Artillery, 14 light batteries and 70 seacoast batteries ................ ···-·· .. 5,075
Infantry, 75 battalions ....................................................• 16,325
Engineers, 1 battalion ...................................................... .
500
485
Ordnance detachments .......................................... ~ ......... .
215
West Point detachments ................................................... .
Indian scouts ............................................................. .
42
50
Signal corps .............................................................. .
Ordnance sergeants ................................ : ...................... .
110

~~!1!1~~~t::r~:f::S~~~ ·. ~: ·.: ·_ ·.: ·.-.·. ·. ·.: ·_:::::: -.-. ::·_:·.::::::: ::::::::::::::::
Hospital Corps ............................................................ .
Miscellaneous .•.••..•••....................................................

80
80

711
14:7

Total • • • • . • • . • • • • • • . . . . . • . . . • • • • . . . • • . . . . . . . . • . • . • . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . 30, 000
Such a force, considered with reference to a territory of 3,000,000 square miles,
provides 1 soldier to 100 square miles.
Cost.-The additional expense involved amounts to about 6t per cent. of the
present annual cost of the .Army, and the increase in the effective strength of the
regiments will be quite 18 per cent.
The effect of the proposed changes upon expenditures has been computed with a
great deal of care. Every feature affecting cost has been considered, and the exhibit
herewith gives a full and complete statement of the result. The ciude results ma,y
be stated as follows (for c.letails see exhibit herewith):
Increase for salaries of commiisioned officers .......•.....•.....••........ $528,880
Increase for pay of enlisted men ..............•.......... : .............. . 738,156
Increase for clothing of enlisted men ........••..................... ~ ... . 200,386
Increase for subsistence of enlisted men ...•.............................
278,251
Forage, etc., for additional horses ...................................... .
24,400
Total increase over present expenditnre for pay, rations, clothing,
andforage ...................••.................................. 1,770,073

Conclusion.-Promotion is but an incidental feature, but this measure, if enacted,
will remove inequalities in respect to promotion that have been the subject of wellfonnded criticism.
The organization will meet the present requirements and all that can be foreseen;
it will place the .Army on a plane of efficiency never before reached, aucl will give, to
many deservingofficers the promotion to which their age and long and efficient seryice
entitle them. Promotions will be equalized in the three arms, and many just cauSfls
of complaint will be removed,
•
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Proposed reorganization of the line of the Army.
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---------1-1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - -Cavalry:
Now ...••••••••••••. 10 10 80120140 120
Proposed ..•..••••••. 10 10 80 120 140 120

480 100
480 120

50 100
50 120

500
600

400
480

200 800 100 4,520 6, 170
240 860 . . • . 4, 820 6, 170

- - - - - - - - - - --1---1---+--~--

Increase . • • • • • • • • . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 20 . . . . 20 100
80
40 60 . . • . . .. - -• • • • • • •
Decrease . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 100 200 .•.•••
51

Artillery: a
Now . . . . • • •• • • • • • • • . 5 5 15 60 180
Proposed ... . .••... : . 7 7 21 84 98

65
84

280
301

60
84

25
35

60
84

260
504

240
392

120 . . . . 180 8, 140 4, 025
168 42 . . .. 8, 850 5, 075

--1---1---1---~-- -

----

Increase .-. . •• • • • • . 21 2 6 24
19
21 24 10 '.!4 244 152
48 42 . . ..
710 1, 050
Decrease . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 82 . . . . . • • . . . . . • . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . • . . . . . . 180 .•.••.. -- - - Ea<:h 1. battery.... . . . . . . .
Eaoh f. battery. . . .

1
1

1
1

1 . . . . . . . . . . .. ..
1 .. .. .. .. .. .. . .

2
3 . .. .
8
6
2 ..... .. .
4
6
==l===l===t==t==I==
1
1

70
58

50
45

Infantry: b
875 200 125 200 800 800 400 .. . . 600 10,20018, 125
Now .. •••..•••••. ... 25 25 25 250 1800 250
Proposed ...... ...... ~~~~ 850 800 1,075 800 125 300 1,2001, 200 ~
I.:..:.:.:..:..:.:.:. 12,900 16,325

~;t:;:S~ :::::::::: ::\:: -~~ -~~ -~o 5~ ·--~~~ -~~~
Eaehcompany ..... ·- \--

···I 1

1

::::1-~~~ --~~~ --~~~ --~~~1::::

1...... .... ....

1

4

4

·iioo -~:'.~~

2 .... ....

.~:~~

48

54

Total now •... ..... . ••.. 40 40 70 430 570 485 1 585 ~480 2001 86015601440 720 800 880 17,860 23, 320
Total proposed ... . ... .. . ~ l~ l1261~ 1588 504 1'. 8061 504 210 50412: 804_2: 072 1,008 402 .... 21, 070 27, 570

~~~l~~~~:'s~·::::::::::

.r -~~\.'.t~8

1

o~ ---~~~ .. :~ .. ~~1-~~

..:~~\- -~~~!- -~~~ -~~~·sso -~·-~~~ _4:~~
1

11 Promotions:

2_ lieutenant-colonels; 4 majors; 10 captains; 34 :first lieutenants; 2 second lieutenan . To be appomted: 21 second lieut nan ts.
old~l~::1t~tl~~- 50 captain ; 10v first lieutenants; 150 second lieutenants. To be appointed: 200 BOO·
c Includes 71 akeleton organizations.

Beoroanization--Effect upon annual expense.
FOR COMMI

I

ED OFFICERS.

INCREA E .

e.
$9,000
8,000
21,000

······--····--· -·- -·- -----···-····-·· -···--······

11,200
5,400
2,600

... ........ -... -. -............. - ............ -............ .

126 200
17 000
12'

.-. -.... -....... -... - .......... --.. -.. -.
. . . . . . . . . .. . -............... -.............. -... ----.

70,000

461 000
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Total artillery ........•.•...........•. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . • . . • • • • • • • • • • .

$126, 200

Total all arms ...•.....•••••................•.•.•.......•...•.•••••
Total decrease ............••....•....•.••.....••..••....•••..••••.•••••.

587,200
58,320

Net increase...................................................... 528,880
Forage for mounted officers' horses, 2 regiments artillery, 44 horses, at $100..
4,400
Forage, etc., for 200 horses for new batteries, at $100. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . 20,000
Total for enlisted men ..•••••..••....•.•.............•• ~ . . • • • • . • • • • • . . . . . 1, 216, 793
Grand total additional . • • • • . • .. . . . . .. . . . • . • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1, 770, 073
DECREASE,

Cavalry:
No change.
Artillery:
6 first lieutenants, at$1,920 ......................................... .
26 first lieutenants, at$1,800 .. ..................................... ..

11,520
46,800

Total artillery ................................................... .

68,320

FOR ENLISTED MEN.
INCUEASE.

Cavalry:
20 first sergeants, at $300 ......... . ................................ ..
100 sergeants, at $i16 ..••..•....................................•••••
80 corporal1:1, at $180 .. .•. •••••................ . .............•....••..
40 musicians, at $156 ............................................... .
60 farriers and saddlers, at $180 ..................................... .

21,600
14,400
6,240
10,800

Total cavalry .•••••••••.•••••.•.........••••.•.••••••••..•••.•.••..

59,040

Artillery:
10 regimental noncommissioned officers ............................ ..
24 first sergeants, at $300 ..••... ... ........ . •....................••••
244 sergeants, at $216 .......•........................................
152 corporals, at $180 .............................................••.
48 musicians, at $156 .........................................•.•.••.
42 farriers and saddlers, at $180 .... ......•.................... _...•..
710 privates, at $156 ..•..........................•.••....••••••.. _...

2,064
7,200
52,700
27,360
7,488
9,160
110,760

Total artillery ..••.......•.•...••......•...........•.•• _••• _•• _ •••

216,732

Infantry:
100 first sergeants, at $300 .......................... . ............... .
400 sergeants, at $216 ............................................. __ .
400 corporals, at $180 ............................................ ___ .
200 musicians, at $156 .............................................. .
2,700 privates, at $156 .............................................•.
44 privates, staff, at $156 .... .... ..... ..... . .••.....•.••....•••••.••••

30,000
86,400
72,000
31,200
421,200
6,864

6,000

!~m ~!lt]f~~- :::~:: ~ ~ ~: :~: ~ :::~ ~ ~ :~ ~ ~ ~ ~:: ::::::::::~ ~ ~ ~:: ~ :::::::

647,664
216,732
59,040

Total all arms ...................................... _.. _... __ . _. _.
Total decrea1:1e ............ ............••.•. __ ... _.... ________ . _. __

923,436
185,280

et increase ...........•....•........•.........................•••
Clothing for 4,294 enlist d men, at $46.67 •.•.........•......... ____ .... __
Subsistence for 4,294 enlisteu men, at $64.80 ....................... _..••. _

738,156
200,386
278,251

Total enlisted men ..•.••••••••••••••••••••.••..•••••.•••••••• _•... 1, 216, 793
H. Hep. 2-13

12

REORGANIZATION OF THE LINE OF THE ARMY.
DECREASE.

Ca.va.lry:
100 wagoners, at $168 ...•.•••••...••••..••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••
200 privates, at $156 .............. --~- ••.••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••

$16,800

Total cavalry ..•••..••........••.•••..••••..••••••••••••..••••••••

48,000
====

Artillery:
120 artificers, at $180 ............................................... .
60 wagoners, at $168 .... ·_........................................... .

31,200

21,600

10,080
31,680

Total artillery ..••........•..........••.........••••••••..••..••••
Infantry:
400 artificers, at $180 ............................................... .
200 wagoners, at $168 ... ; .................•.......•...•...•.•••.••••

====

Tota.I infantry ................................................... .

:f;~t:l ~~~~l~;.::: ·.:::: :::::-. :::~ ~ ~ :~: ~ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Tota.I decrease ••••••••••.•.............•••.•••••••••••••••••••••••

0

72,000
33,600
105,600
31,680

48,000

185,~

